This study investigates what is an appropriate level of investment management fees. We extend existing results and provide a several formula for the case of power utility and normal returns. Using the CRRA utility function with the range of the coe¢cient of the CRRA suggested by Mehra and Prescott (1985) , we …nd that the value of information added by linear factor models of Fama and French (1992) exceeds observed management fees and only equals them for hitherto unmeasured magnitudes of risk aversion.
This paper has not been submitted elsewhere in identical or similar form, nor will it be during the …rst three months after its submission to European Finance Review.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to use utility theory to develop a valuation model for stochastic information. Such a model is an extension of an existing model by Treich (1997) . However, this new model can be used to evaluate a wider range of informational situations, particularly those prevalent in the world of asset management.
Thus we can price forecasts of active managers both in terms of a down payment, and/or a pro…t share. Furthermore these payments can be related to the performance of the forecasting model provided by the active manager so that one can evaluate a model which provides an information coe¢cient of, say, 7%.
In the next section, we provide the theoretical development. With the assumptions that asset returns and information are joint normally distributed, and for a constant relative risk aversion class of utility, we can derive closed form expressions for the value of information.
In section 3, using the results in section 2, we apply our analysis to evaluating the Fama-French model (1992) of risk premia based on styles, size and value. That is, we ask the question how much would a fund manager pay Professors Fama and French for the information that size and value can be used to select stocks. We …nd that within the range of the relative risk aversion coe¢cient (°) suggested by some previous studies, i.e., 1 <°< 2; the value of information for the Fama-French model is too large, e.g., 1-2% a month. These results are consistent with Mehra and Prescott (1985) who show that, for constant relative risk aversion utility, investors would have to have the value of°in excess of 30 to explain the historical equity premium. When we set°= 30, we …nd that the value of information becomes smaller but still much higher than the management fee which investors pay to fund management companies in practice.
We stress that our contribution is to pricing of information. This study is not about the forecastibility of returns or the welfare gains from asset allocation. See Balduzzi and Lynch (1999) , Barberis (2000) , Brandt (1999 Brandt ( , 2001 ), Campbell and Viceira (1999) , Xia (2001) for the implications for portfolio choice and welfare.
Lynch (2000) has examined the case where the menu available to investor includes di¤erent size and value portfolios. The implication of predictability is also ignored in this paper, since we restrict attention to investors with only one-month horizon investor. Other work of interest has been carried out by Barberis (2000) Xia (2001) and others who take into consideration that the predictability relations derived from the data are only estimates. Thus the investor will have uncertainty about whether this relation is in the data generation model or not, and will learn about it over time.
Whilst other decision making models such as the loss aversion (LA) utility of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) may be more appropriate to deal with these problems, they are much harder to implement. We can not provide analytical and numerical results due to the complexity of the utility function used in prospect theory.
Our results show that the CRRA utility function needs a large value of the parameter to explain the management fees observed in practice. Using these high risk aversion models, we …nd that, even though eight years has passed since Fama and French (1992) published their paper, the linear factor model based on styles still provides additional information to the conventional CAPM. Also we …nd that the value of the additional information is more or less constant over time and has retained its value, notwithstanding substantial informational di¤usion. We can infer an added value of active management of about 250 basis points a year based on the Fama-French model in excess of the capital asset pricing model. This can be contrasted with typical active fees that are currently about 45 basis points in the USA over the period 1990 to 1995.
To compute a value of°so that the price of information equals 48 basis points, we need°to equal around 155. This can be interpreted in a number of ways. Firstly, power utility may be even more inadequate a tool in risk analysis than previously imagined. Secondly, and in contrast, fees for active management are cheap relative to the value that they add. Or …nally, it is still possible to get excess returns with the Fama-French model.
The Standard portfolio model with information
We shall structure the problem in terms of N assets with rates of return r i , i = 1; :::; N , r = (r 1 ; r 2 ; :::; r N ) 0 , and initial wealth w 0 plus one riskless asset, cash, with a rate of return, r f . Then period 1 wealth, w 1 , is
where x is the vector of portfolio proportions, e is a (N £ 1) vector of ones and
Here we do not structure our analysis in terms of returns relative to a benchmark which is the analysis typically used in asset management. For such a case, risk is measured relative to a benchmark, and fees and performance related bonuses are often paid in terms of over/under performance relative to the benchmark as well.
To deal with such a case, we would need to rede…ne the expected utility function in (2). However, we prefer to present our results in a more conventional economic framework so that investors are motivated by …nal wealth, or total, not relative, returns.
The investor has an increasing concave Bernoulli utility function u(w) and chooses
x to maximise E(u(w 1 )) subject to x 0 e = 1: Let
Information enters the problem as a set of n conditioning variables, y, thus (2) is modi…ed to
Pricing of information can be achieved in a variety of ways. In the relationships above, we have, as a possible pricing equation,
where p 0 would represent the minimum amount one would have to be compensated not to receive information Y , where Y are the random variables whose values are y. This has the interpretation of how much initial wealth would you be prepared to
give up/receive to equate utility with information to utility without information. Treich's (1997) de…nition is similar to (4) except that
where w 1 is de…ned by (1) and p 1 is now the minimum amount of end-period wealth required to compensate the investor for not having the information. This de…nition assumes that fund managers will be compensated at the end of period.
Other versions are possible; we could have, for example,
Then equating
i.e., equating equations (2) and (6), we de…ne p 0 0 as the maximum amount of initial wealth the investor will pay to acquire information, p 0 1 is the maximum amount of …nal (…xed) wealth the investor will pay, and¸is the minimum proportion of active income retained so that (1 ¡¸) is the maximum proportional active pro…t that the investor will give up.
In equation (6) Nadiminti, Mukhopadhyay, and Kriebel (1996) .
Although the de…nitions above have involved utility maximisation, i.e., maximising u(w 1 ) with respect to x, the de…nitions would still apply if x were partially …xed so that managers/investors need not be pro…t maximisers in all situations. Thus prices for information could be de…ned in terms of a current portfolio without information which is unmaximised but a maximised portfolio if information is received.
In this study, we investigate the case that the value of information is paid at the beginning of the period.
Assuming compact returns (see Ingersoll, 1987) , we can justify Taylor's series to second order in expanding (4), (5), and (7). Expanding (7) with p 0 1 = 0,¸= 1; we see that
where
we have
How do we proceed in solving (7), i.e., solving for p
where u 0 , u 1 , and u 2 are de…ned as above except that w 
There are issues as to whether returns are in fact normally distributed. These have been discussed at great length in many places and we do not repeat the discussion here.
The implication of Assumption 1 is that
Note that
and
Thus we have
Using the same method for the case of no information in (10), we have
and p 0 0 can be determined numerically for any given distribution satisfying Assumption 1 and any particular utility function.
Logarithmic utility
This does raise the question as to whether (15) has any explicit solutions. It transpires that u(w 1 ) = ln(w 1 ) has the property that u 2 1 =u 2 = ¡1 for all value of w. We thus make Assumption 2.
Assumption 2 u(w) = ln(w):
Using Assumptions 1 and 2 and substituting into (15) gives
since they bear a close resemblance to conventional goodness of …t measures in linear regression. Furthermore, since z=(1+z) is a concave function, we can apply Jensen's inequality so that R 2 y¸E
Now § · § rr in the positive semi-de…nite sense, so that §
¡1¸ §¡1
rr in the positive semi-de…nite sense and Now the above arguments extend to the case where the investor is wishing to buy the information (y) and already has an information set (y 0 ). Thus the immediate generalisation of (8), (9) and (10) would be given by
thus,
where the appropriate pricing concept is used analogously to equations (4), (5), (6), and (7).
In particular, if we make assumptions 1 and 2, and de…ne ª = (y; y 0 ) to be the augmented information set, then an argument identical to the one above shows that we can calculate p 0 0 as
The de…nition of R 2 y 0 and R 2 ª are as follows. Let
; etc, and
By extensions of the previous argument,
is non-negative and so we see that the extra information is valued in terms of extra R 2 :
Power utility and loss aversion utility
We now consider a more general CRRA utility function with the power utility function. Note that when the coe¢cient of the power utility function is one, the utility function is equivalent to the logarithmic utility function. The power utility function we use in this study is as follows;
In this case,
Substituting the above equations into (15) gives
and we have
if we consider the situation as in (19).
Many previous studies, either theoretically or empirically, suggest that the admissable range of the coe¢cient of the CRRA,°, is between one and two (see Arrow, 1971; Tobin and Dolde, 1971; Friend and Blume, 1975; Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Kehoe, 1984) . However, with such a range of°, a large equity premium in the US cannot be explained. Mehra and Prescott (1985) suggest that the puzzle can only be solved when°is of the order of 30. In addition, the portfolios of US investors do not seem to be explained by standard portfolio choice models such as CRRA. This can be summarised as excessive equity positions of the US investors unless investors are unreasonably risk averse (see Campbell and Viceira, 1998) .
The puzzle has been tackled from various perspectives by other studies such as Rietz (1988) , and Benartzi and Thaler (1995) . Recently, Ang, Bekeart and Liu (2000) suggest that the disappointment aversion preferences of Gul (1991) may ex-plain the portfolio choice of US investors. This has similarities to the loss aversion class of utility introduced by Tversky (1979, 1992) . Although prospect theory utility seems to be promising way of pricing information, the closed form solution for (7) is very di¢cult to obtain and approximations of the sort given in this paper do not bring about signi…cant simpli…cations. So, whilst such theories probably lead to more realistic prices, they do not lend themselves to the methodologies advanced in this paper. Our approach therefore will be to carry out computations with power and log-utility and report results for a range of values of°.
Empirical tests
One of the important bene…ts in our derivation of information value in the previous section is that we can now calculate the value of information with an assumption of a particular utility function. In this section, we calculate the value of information with the logarithmic utility function in (19) as well as the power utility function in (21) for di¤erent values of°.
We calculate the value of information using CAPM and linear factor models, especially for the Fama and French model (1992) of risk premia on value and size. Thus, we use three factors as explanatory variables; excess market returns and two factor mimicking portfolio (FMP) returns for value and size. Factor portfolios may be portfolios of equities corresponding to attractive equity characteristics such as size or value. The factor portfolios may be actual indices such as the S&P500, FTSE100 (for size) or arti…cially constructed portfolios long in high value equities and short in low value equities (for value).
The data we use are the log-returns of the S&P500 index and 450 individual equities belonging to the S&P500 index, 3 month US treasury bill, and FMP returns for value and size. A total number of 180 monthly returns from April 1984 to March 1999 is used. Excess individual equity returns and market returns are calculated by taking the 3 month US treasury bill from individual equity returns and market returns, respectively. Due to the changes of the components in the S&P500 index and unavailable equity returns in early stages of our sample period, the number of available equities at the beginning of the sample period is 350.
Factor mimicking portfolios (FMPs)
A factor mimicking portfolio (FMP) is a portfolio of assets whose returns are designed to be highly correlated with the (unobservable) factor values. Portfolios constructed from eigenvectors in principal component analysis are examples of factor mimicking portfolios.
In this study, we use two sets of value and size factors; our own factors as described below, and the Fama-French factors in the website http://web.mit. edu/kfrench/www.
We …rst explain how our FMPs are constructed in detail. The explanation on the Fama-French factors can be found in the website above and interesting readers can refer to the website.
Our factor mimicking portfolios are constructed with the same method as in Hwang and Satchell (1999) and Hall, Hwang, and Satchell (2001) . To calculate the FMPs, we use a total number of 2046 US equities in the MSCI universe from April 1984 to March 1999. For each factor f , the universe is ranked by an attribute of f .
For instance, f might be the size factor and the universe of stocks would be ranked by their size attribute data. Then an equally weighted portfolio is formed that is long the top n-tile ranked by the f attribute, and short the bottom n-tile, ranked by the f attribute. The resulting hedge portfolio is the factor mimicking portfolio of factor f . The order of the n-tile should typically be small. Thus, the use of quartiles (n = 4) or thirds (n = 3) is probably more appropriate than the use of, for example, deciles (n = 10), because of the greater diversi…cation produced. In this particular model thirds have been used.
The two attributes used in this study are value (VL) and size (SZ). The FMPs calculated for the two styles are the factor mimicking portfolios for value (FVL) and size (FSZ). Note that the returns of the FMPs are calculated each month. Thus, the number of equities used for the calculation of FMPs changes over time (but the maximum number is 2046). The values of the two attributes for each equity are de…ned as :
where DP t = Dividend(t) Share P rice(t) ;
EP t = Earnings P er Share(t) Share P rice(t) ; SP t = N et Sales P er Share(t) Share P rice(t) ;
BP t = Book V alue P er Share(t) Share P rice(t) ;
CP t = Cash F low P er Share(t) Share P rice(t) :
The above procedure can be seen as a natural way to make the factor mimicking portfolios approximately uncorrelated. If the true factors are uncorrelated, then sorting by the attributes and constructing long and short positions relative to factor 1, say, should produce a portfolio with little to no systematic exposure to factor 2. Actually, the attributes themselves may be strongly correlated and, as a consequence, fully uncorrelated portfolios cannot be expected. However, it is considered that this procedure is preferable to using factor analysis or principal components, since then one usually loses any understanding of what the factors signify.
Some of the statistical properties of excess market returns and FMP returns are reported in panel A of table 1. None of the factor returns have mean returns signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Note that correlations between the excess market returns and the two FMPs are signi…cant and all three explanatory variables are not normally distributed. Thus our assumption of multivariate normality may be too strong. However, our choice and calculation of explanatory variables are not di¤erent from those used in practice, and thus our calculations should have some parallels with the economic realities of fund management.
As explained above, we also use two Fama-French Benchmark Factors; the performance of small stocks relative to big stocks (SMB, Small Minus Big) and the performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks (HML, High Minus Low).
Note that Fama-French SMB and HML are equivalent to our factor mimicking portfolios, FSZ and FVL, respectively. The more detailed explanation on these factor returns can be found in Fama and French (1993) .
However, since the construction methods and the universe between our factors Other statistics such as skewness and excess kurtosis do not seem to be similar. As explained above, these results come from the di¤erences in the construction of the factors. Despite these di¤erences, we note that none of the statistics in panel A are statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from those of panel B of table 1. However, the correlation matrixes show that we can …nd similar relationship between the factors and the market portfolio in both cases; FVL is signi…cantly negatively correlated with the market portfolio returns and the FSZ, and HML is also signi…cantly negatively correlated with the market portfolio returns and the SMB.
The correlation matrixes in panels A and B suggest that the value of information obtained with these two di¤erent sets of factors may be similar. In the next subsection, we try to answer this question by investigating how much we have to pay for the CAPM and the Fama-French model with these factors.
Empirical results
For the calculation of the value of information, we need to invert a variance-covariance matrix in equation (20) In most cases, however, our interests lie in the forecasting power of the CAPM or the linear factor models. Whilst it might be a useful exercise to look at current explanatory variables to explain current returns for the added value in more e¢cient risk control management, this is probably secondary to forecasting in terms of the relevance of the application. Thus, we use one month lagged excess market returns for the CAPM, and one month lagged excess market returns and one month lagged factor mimicking portfolio (FMP) returns for value and size for the Fama and French linear factor model. The information in the original CAPM and the Fama and
French model is simultaneous with equity returns (current information), whilst the information in forecasting equity returns in this study is past (past information).
Of course, one could argue that this information is more useful to diversify stocks than to forecast stocks. Our mythical fund manager who is buying this information is using it to forecast. This setting is more realistic since many models in practice are based on these approaches. show, unsurprisingly, that the fee paid decreases with°: Taking°= 30 as our proxy for the real utility function, we see that active management adds 240 basis points a year to the CAPM. To achieve 4 basis points a month we need°equivalent to 155! Many authors have argued that large values of the relative risk aversion coe¢cient are incompatible with economic theory. This incompatibility stems from models where the representative agent has power utility and the equity risk premium can be calculated as°cov(returns to equity, change in consumption), where°i s the coe¢cient of RRA. It is claimed that the continuous time consumption CAPM will not allow large values of°as it will lead to negative interest rates (see Weil, 1989; Cochrane, 1997) . Other macroeconomic anomalies are also mentioned in Cochrane (pages 16-17, 1997) . We argue that our utility function is that of a typical (but not representative) fund manager; thus large values of°can co-exist with any representative agent utility, except under rather idealised situations where power utility aggregation may apply.
The empirical results reported in Bauman, Conover, and Miller, 1999; Hwang and Satchell, 2000) . It is worth noting that the values of information are highly autocorrelated; the estimates of the autocorrelation coe¢cient with lag one are around 0.84.
The …gures also suggest that the value of information does not seem to show any long run trend. Furthermore, the value of the additional information shows no signi…cant di¤erence over time. This means that the Fama-French model can be still valued after their initial publication of their research in 1992 and that the value has not been diluted by the di¤usion of information. Thus one explanation, that as a theory becomes widely known, its incremental value decreases as many investors incorporate it into their trading strategies, does not appear to be upheld by our analysis. There may be a linkage between the persistence of the value of information and the information variables being sources of risk rather than anomalies.
Whilst we might stand accused of rediscovering the equity premium puzzle by yet another circuitous route, our use of power utility with a°of 30 or higher can be seen as a proxy for a more complex utility function. Our proxy has been calibrated to get the risk premia approximately right and hence hopefully, the value of information right. Based on this interpretation, our informational values could be deemed to be sensible.
We note several limitations of our exercise, which may reduce the high value of information for the CAPM and the Fama-French model. Firstly, we do not exclude short-selling and this might in ‡uence results. In our study, the sum of the absolute values of portfolio weights was about eight on average. Thus our "optimal" portfolios were characterised by large numbers of large long and short positions. If our fund manager was a long-short investor with longs at 130% and shorts at 30%, we might express the absolute magnitude of portfolio weights to be 1.6. Thus our idealised portfolios are traded about …ve times more than we might expect for an active manager and are …ve times more geared than we might expected for a long-short manager.
Secondly, we ignore transaction costs. Since we assume that our representative agent is an institutional investor who is trading S&P500 stocks through portfolio trades, her transaction costs are likely to be of the order of 25 basis points per trade.
Since trading is monthly and turn-over is of the order of 80 percent per annum, annual transaction costs may only be of the order of 20 basis points. However, we found that our turn-over, was on average, about 40% a month; this is obviously very high and our value of information would be much smaller if we traded at this level and paid even modest costs.
Conclusions
Our paper has provided a procedure for the evaluation of information that generalises existing procedures. Furthermore, in certain cases, we can derive closed form expressions for the price of information. This approach is applied to the valuation of the Fama-French model. Thus we may answe the question 'do active managers overcharge for providing stock selection skills based on linear factor models?' Our results suggest that an active manager who uses past factor information to forecast returns adds about 240 basis points over and above market information relative to a fee of between 30 to 70 basis points. Thus performance is considerably in excess of current fee structures and suggests that current fees are cheap, even if we allow for 50 basis points for annual transaction costs in trading.
We found that a degree of relative risk aversion that equates fees in practise with the fees derived from theory requires that°, the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion, be set to 155! From here we conclude that either power utility is even worse than we previously thought or that active management is currently rather cheap at about 50 basis points a year.
However, because of the limitations in this study, the value of information in the CAPM and the Fama-French model seems to be much less than calculated in this study and thus the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion will be smaller than the numbers we found. Despite the limitations, we still expect that there may be a non-trivial information value for the Fama-French model, since the value does not show any upward or downward trend over last several years. The above statistics for the excess market returns and two factor mimicking portfolio returns are calcualted with 180 monthly returns from April 1984 to March 1999. The excess market returns are obtained with S&P500 index total returns minus 3 month US Treasury bill rate. The two factor mimicking portfolio returns are calculated as described in Hall, Hwang and Satchell (2000) with 2046 US equities. The above results are obtained with monthly excess returns of randomly selected 450 equities belonging to the S&P500 index from April 1984 to March 1999. Due to the changes of the constituents in the S&P500 index and unavailable equity returns in early stages of our sample period, the number of available equity returns in early stages of our sample period is 350. The excess monthly market returns were calculated with S&P500 index total returns and the 3 month US Treasury bill. To avoid difficulties in calculation, we group the equities randomly such that in each group 50 equities are assigned. The value of information was calculated with the assumption of the logarithmic and power utility functions. By 'Lagged Factor Returns', we mean one period (month) before excess market return and FMP returns as explanaroty factors.
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